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Abstract !
The idea of  a human rights Church school raises challenges from (at least) two opposing quarters. The ardent 
secularist will doubt a Church school can be a human rights school, as Church denotes a theological moral 
framework that does not accord with (secular) human rights. A Christian who opposes the language of  human 
rights being drawn into the Christian ethos will oppose the Human rights Church School as not being Christian 
enough. Ergo the Human rights Church School cannot have a satisfactorily human rights ethos (for the 
secularist) or satisfactorily Church ethos (for the Christian). This paper challenges both of  these arguments as 
failing to truly represent the interconnectedness of  Christian and human rights thought and action, and further it 
suggests the human rights Church school is an example of  a particular school for the common good, also 
disrupting some assumptions about common schooling and schools of  a religious character. !!!!!
Introduction !
The assumption is that religion subverts human rights education as religion stands against human rights because 
it is for patriarchy, bias, illiberalism and hierarchical control, or at least some aren’t secularists will claim. The 
notion of  a Human rights Church School masks this reality. However, an opposer from the opposite corner will 
make a similar case that a Church school cannot be a human rights school. This is also due to the ethos of  a 
Church school contradicting the ethos of  a human rights school. A Christian who opposes the language of  
human rights being drawn into the Christian ethos will oppose the Human rights Church School. For Christians 
to be involved in human rights education is a failure to understand the moral law does not reside in human 
norms, but in divine revelation. Human rights are human made and come not from scripture but flawed human 
thinking.  !
Yet within Christian thought we find a number of  ideas that can nourish human rights. First in terms of  a basic 
attitude towards humanity: The imago die doctrine, that human beings were made in the image and likeness of  
God, the doctrine of  the incarnation and theosis, that God could become man so that human beings could 
partake in Christ’s divinity. Second in terms of  Christian morality: the golden rule, agape love, the idea of  
compassion and responsibility for the other and the idea of  human autonomy and liberation. Is a Christian 
approach to human rights education possible or meaningful? What might it look like? What does it look like? 
This paper sets out some thinking around these questions and a case for an alternative to either of  these 
accounts. It critically considers whether there are Christian reasons for human rights education and considers 
what Christian approaches to HRE add to core ideas in HRE. This principles offer a Christian understand of  
human rights and are suggestive of  an approach to human rights education that integrates a concept of  a kind 
of  school and an approach to moral education. 
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Part 1. What do we mean by a human rights school? !
The virtue of  human rights themselves are seen variously as an attempt to assert a moral shared vision, or at least 
language, that can help protect the weak and innocent from oppression, a framework for an international system 
of  justice for resolving differences between governments peacefully and holding brutal dictators to account, or 
an attempt to assert a universal moral culture. These arguments are common enough but what of  a human rights 
school?  The idea of  a human rights school is one where the ethos and character of  the school is sympathetic to 
the human rights. At its heart is the expression in the 1948 Preamble and Article 26 of  the UDHR (Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights), which make HRE a right in itself  and define the Declaration as an act of  HRE 
(Morsink 1999, 326). The preamble of  the UDHR stresses the ‘common understanding’ of  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as values or ‘common standards’ of  achievement.  These should be promoted through 
teaching and education by every individual and organisation.  HRE is an individual and collective duty (Baxi 
1997). !
The notion of  a human rights school is linked to the United Nations concept of  human rights education (HRE) 
which in turn is based on the international declarations and conventions of  human rights.  HRE is burgeoning 
pedagogical formation based on human rights universals which has undergone a worldwide dramatic expansion 
since the 1970s (Andreopoulos & Claude 1997; Campbell & Covell 2001; Claude 1996; Keet 2007; Suarez 2006; 
Suarez & Ramirez 2007; Tibbitts 2002).  Suarez and Ramirez (2007) pronounce the ‘strength and the success of  
human rights education at the global level’ (Ibid. pp.22-3) with an increasing number of  developing countries 
including HRE in their education systems (UNESCO 2005).  !
During the 1990s, the international documents on HRE were elaborated and progressively became part of  a 
worldwide educational discourse (Lenhart & Savolainen 2002).  In 1995, HRE had gained enough momentum 
that the United Nations proclaimed a United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2004) 
(UNHCR 1994) and after that a World Programme for Human Rights Education, the second phase of  which is 
currently underway (UNHCR 2005).  By the end of  the 1990s, numerous teaching orientated resources were 
produced which sought to translate educational ideas into strategies, pedagogies and professional practice 
(Lenhart & Savolainen 2002; OHCHR 2003; Reardon 1995; UNESCO 1998).  There was a drive to make HRE 
an integral part of  mainstream education, integrated into all subjects and, in the UK, especially in citizenship 
education (Gearon 2003a, 2007; Smith 2003). HRE includes imparting skills, sharing of  knowledge and molding 
attitudes: !
Human rights education can be defined as education, training and information aiming at building a universal 
culture of  human rights through the sharing of  knowledge, imparting of  skills and molding of  attitudes directed 
to: (a) The strengthening of  respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (b) The full development of  
the human personality and the sense of  its dignity; (c) The promotion of  understanding, tolerance, gender 
equality and friendship among all nations, indigenous peoples and racial, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic 
groups; (d) The enabling of  all persons to participate effectively in a free and democratic society governed by the 
rule of  law; (e) The building and maintenance of  peace;  (f) The promotion of  people-centred sustainable 
development and social justice. (UNHCR 2005) !
HRE is conceived as a force for societal transformation (UNESCO 1993) through the establishment of  a 
universal culture of  human rights (UNHCR 2005) !
The transformative dimension of  HRE applies to outward global change, conceived through inner personal 
change. HRE has been bolstered by its inclusion in the Convention on the Rights of  the Child (UN General 
Assembly 1989) (CRC), which signatories have a legal obligation to implement.  HRE constitutes an international 
influence on national moral education and a unique contribution to education.  Because human rights in the 
twenty-first century are international, with international agreements and conventions that are widely known, 
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HRE provides a footing in the curriculum that is supranational.  Just as it can offer a position of  consensus 
within diverse societies, it can provide an influence from a perspective of  international or global consensus. This 
provides a sense of  the ethos or culture of  a school proclaiming itself  to being a human rights school. We would 
expect to see these kinds of  moral messages reflected in the structures of  the school its relationships with 
stakeholders and the moral vision it extends.  !
In Britain the most significant example of  the human rights schools are those that have sought out Rights 
Respecting School status, a designation that is set, and awarded by UNICEF UK. This substantial HRE initiative 
promotes using human rights to permeate the ethos and life of  a school (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission 2009).  There were already signs that HRE in schools had positive impacts (Covell & Howe 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2005). Studies in Canada and the UK examined the impact of  teaching children’s rights as a means 
of  promoting rights-respecting attitudes, encouraging children to learn that they are worthy of  respect, have 
rights and live in a society which is committed to their present and future wellbeing (Covell et al. 2002).  If  
children are not taught about their rights they are more likely to equate their rights with their wishes, and fail to 
understand the rights of  all.  !
Hampshire County Council ran a pilot of  the scheme called Rights, Respect and Responsibility (http://
www.unicef.org.uk/Education/Rights-Respecting-Schools-Award/) involving 380 primary schools and 48 
secondary schools in the county (Covell & Howe 2005). Some schools have reported significant reductions in 
bullying and other behavior improvements (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009, p.60). UNICEF’s 
Rights Respecting Schools scheme (UNICEF 2008) seeks to raise pupil achievement and improve the quality of  
their life.  There are four evidence based strands to the project: to share Rights-respecting values underpin 
leadership and management, to ensure the whole-school community learns about the UN Convention on the 
Rights of  the Child, to ensure the school has a rights-respecting ethos and to seek to empower children to 
become active citizens and learners. They study the CRC as a guide for living.  In 2009 the inquiry reported that 
over 500 schools across the UK registered with the project and that the University of  Sussex evaluated the 
scheme in 2008 and found improved behavior and self-esteem and some improvements in learning (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission 2009, p.59).  These projects are about the whole school ethos as well as the kind of  
curriculum being taught in lessons or subjects and it is not clear whether the changes are down to human rights 
education per se, or other ethos nurturing activities. As of  June 2014 there are 3283 schools taking part. 2627 
primary schools, 379 secondary, 152 Special schools, 16 Pupil referral units and 109 early years’ settings. Brighton 
University in 2010 concluded  !
“The RRSA has had a profound effect on the majority of  the schools involved in the programme. For some 
school communities, there is strong evidence that it has been a life-changing experience. In the documentation 
from one infant school, the head said, “After 16 years as head teacher at […] school, I cannot think of  anything 
else we have introduced that has had such an impact.”” (UNCEF 2010) (Available at http://www.unicef.org.uk/
Documents/Education-Documents/RRSA_Evaluation_Report.pdf  Accessed 10.7.2014)  !
Changes observed included a major shift in attitudes and values with a focus on responsibilities and rights, with 
improvements on behavior and an increase in active involvement in campaigns to uphold rights. Attitudes 
towards diversity were uniformly positive and there was a significant shift in the involvement of  pupils in 
decision making with pupils involved in aspects of  schools governance (2010:7-9).  !
One of  the features of  the Rights Respecting Schools initiative is the involvement of  different kinds of  schools, 
from different categories, including community schools, academies and Church schools. Much is made of  the 
distinctive ethos of  the Church school, so how can you have a Church school that puts human rights at the heart 
of  its ethos? Human rights are an international, universal culture or statement, and yet a Church school must 
surely be defined a distinctively Christian foundation, rather than human rights? Indeed, more than this. There 
are some grounds for suspicion that Church schools are not champions of  human rights. 
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Part 2: Church schools are tainted by Christianity's incompatibility with human rights values. !
Secular suspicions about Christian education and religious involvement in human rights !
There are two parts to this challenge. The first is a general secular suspicion about the role of  religion in 
education, and the second is a criticism of  the idea that religion is in a good place to sponsor institutions to teach 
about human rights.  !
The first part is familiar to those who are knowledgeable about opponents to publicly funded faith schooling. 
These can be summarised as follows. Religion has had a dubious impact on education. Religions have been 
involved in scandalous abuse of  children and cannot be trusted with the wellbeing and basic rights of  children. 
Whatever goods it gained historically, in recent decades a multitude of  abuse cases went unrevealed and 
unpunished, because religion held and unchallengeable semi-theocratic position in society. Religious authorities 
have proved unreliable and untrustworthy when it came to child protection and abusive law breaking because of  
mixed allegiances. Criminals were moved around, victims silenced. Religion is, therefore, untrustworthy with 
education. Schools are safer when the power of  the Church is weak, because the rights of  victims need 
safeguarding. !
Another concern can be noted here. Religions are not a suitable organisation to be running public education 
because a religion is particular and leans towards one particular narrative whilst the public are plural and diverse 
in their belief  systems. We might question whether religion lacks a basic rationality that undermines its position 
to be in a position to direct education. Religions are systems framed by belief  or superstition, not rational 
evidence and education should be led by rational evidence, not belief. We might question whether religion is bias 
to unquestionable doctrines that limit its critical functionality. To protect individual autonomy requires a secular 
school leadership. A religion is therefore not well placed to serve the interests of  the diverse public. Religions are 
not democratic organisations but are led by privileged groups, often privileging men over women. Religions 
commonly uphold conservative moral frameworks that oppose freedoms for women, gays, and so on. Religious 
rights often get twisted to become the right to protect religious institutions. !
Against these claims we might amass a range of  arguments. Religion is often involved in sponsoring schools that 
educate children from a wide range of  backgrounds that parents are happy with. Religion is a dimension of  
community, and schools should be conceived as community organisations rather than statist centrist public 
bodies. A religious school could arguable be more locally accountable than a Government school, run by a 
distance corporate body or central government department. Religious schools offer different visions of  life and 
provide alternatives to parents and children other than a singular conception of  a state ethos school adding to 
chocie. Children's identities should be nurtured by their schools and holistic visions of  education should have a 
spiritual dimensions which religions offer. Religious schools therefore provide support for children's identity. !
There remains considerable and unresolved disagreement about the strength of  the merits of  each point of  view. 
Presently UK legislation allows for and promotes schools of  a religious character that are state funded. !
A second argument challenges religion as a suitable authority to promote human rights. Even if  there is a case 
for religious schooling, there is no case for religion as a pedagogic foundation for HRE. Human Rights offer a 
universalistic ethic that many different peoples need to be able to embrace and giving a particular religious 
foundation turns a universalistic ethic into an exclusive one. The pedagogical approach to HRE needs to be 
educative and should not be religious. Religion itself  has an ambivalent relationship with human rights, often 
linked with cultural forces that are opposed to equality. There are compelling examples of  religion as patriarchal 
and anti-gay, suggesting basic ethics that are not compatible for a grounding for human rights. This ethical 
incompatibility means we might be most hesitant before adopting or accepting any suggestion of  a Christian 
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approach to HRE. The suspicion would be that a Christian approach would by definition erode the equality 
values which human rights education seek to advance.  !
This might be countered by the claim that Christianity is also found to be a champion of  human rights. 
Christianity professes a preferential option for the poor. A Church of  the poor for the poor, Pope Francis has 
said. It's prophetic tradition is rooted in an concern for the dispossessed, the unjustly treated. It's radical message 
of  liberation, from Moses to Jesus, seek to unleash binds, set the downtrodden free. It's concern seeks active 
change, the coming of  the Kingdom, a time of  justice and peace. It's Messianic message is to liberate and save 
from sin and death, and to challenge wealth and earthly power.  Such messages have inspired anti-slavery 
campaigners for centuries, and are behind enormous charitable donations healthcare. The right to religious 
freedom has focussed Christianity's attention on the necessary specifics of  what human rights do for religion, 
and the shadow of  soviet religious repression is coast long on the Experiences of  Easter. Here Christianity is a 
champion for freedom, and freedom is a basic orientation of  human rights ethical framework.  !!
Part 3: Theological suspicions about human rights !
Opposition to human rights and human rights education also comes from theological sources that challenge the 
idea of  Christian human rights schools. This results from a belief  that Christian ethics arise out of  divine origins, 
principally revelation. This discussion locates itself  around the idea of  human dignity. This is the foundation of  
the secular UDHR, but also, in the Christian tradition, it is at the centre of  theological debates around human 
rights. There are additional theological sources which may support human rights - love of  neighbour, justice etc, 
but here I shall focus on foundational ideas, and in particular dignity. !
Protestant skepticism of  Christian human rights and dignity !
Soulen and Woodhead warn against an over emphasis on humanity, without due regard to the fallibility or sinful 
nature of  humanity. The beginning of  Christian development is the recognition of  one'a sinfulness - first you 
must repent. It's not about raising human beings up in status but accepting fallenness. Martin Luther held that 
the image and likeness of  God was lost after the fall, though it could be restored through the Word and the Holy 
Spirit as they think, feel and want exactly what God wants (Grenz 2002, p.165).  Calvin held that it was corrupted 
and whatever left is a deformity (Shih 2004). Human rights in this sense becomes a form of  idolatry, replacing 
divine goodness with human superiority.  Soulen and Woodhead are concerned that a Kantian sense of  dignity 
which points to the issue with human rights. They want to recontextualise dignity to one which is informed by 
biblical perspectives centred on creation, redemption and sanctification rather than a Kantian, non biblical sense 
(Soulen & Woodhead 2006). !
Some Christian theologians argue rather than being an inherent feature of  humanity dignity is a gift from the 
founding divine Father, God, from Genesis 1:26ff  (see also Psalm 8.5ff  and Sirah 17.1- 11) which holds that 
human beings are created in the image and likeness of  God. It is a gift given by the Creator to the created, which 
does not come about because of  anything inherent in the created being.  The suggestion that dignity can be 
based on something inherent to humanity, such as human rationality or freedom (as Kant would have it), is to 
decontextualise dignity from the proper Christian narrative. The secular formulation of  dignity and human rights 
undermines a theological imperative.  The specialness of  human worth was a gift from God that has mistakenly 
been turned into an aspect of  humanity (Soulen & Woodhead 2006). The theological imperative that human 
beings are not saved because of  any worth of  their own but out of  God’s love, is undermined by making dignity 
inherent in human beings.  Additionally, the notion that moral obligation leads to human rights is in fact a 
deviation from a more orthodox Christian determination that moral obligation leads to human duties or 
responsibilities (Fortin 1991). !
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Soulen and Woodhead identify the shifting condition of  the context through which dignity has developed, from 
the early Christian narratives to the modern period.  The early Church provided a process of  contextualisation 
but the modern period has been one of  decontextualisation which provides little adequate moral basis. They set 
about a project of  recontextualisation, from a Protestant Christian perspective.  This is not aimed at restoring 
dignity as a foundation, but rather restoring its proper derivative role with God as the foundation. The Christian 
conception of  dignity, therefore, is markedly different from the contemporary conception, outlined in the 
UDHR, which is founded in an intrinsic and inherent dignity.  If  dignity is conferred as a gift from God, rather 
than a possession or quality of  humanity, then it cannot be inherent.  This forms a stance which is opposed to 
rights-centred morality.  Morality is a recognition of  responsibilities, rather than rights.  Dignity is part of  God’s 
action to humanity and redemption in Christ.  It is not self-possession but dispossession, ‘not so much entering 
into oneself  but in reaching out in love and care to the other.’ (Soulen & Woodhead 2006, p.6)  It is an idea that, 
rather than focusing on the worth of  human beings, focuses on Christ.  Soulen and Woodhead see the Christian 
conception of  dignity as distant from the contemporary (Kantian) concept.  If  dignity is founded on any aspect 
of  humanity that is not based on the divine foundation that they see as fundamental to Christianity, then it is 
incompatible with Christianity. !!
Catholic scepticism about Christian human rights and dignity !
A similar case for rejecting what is called the secular understanding of  autonomy or freedom is made within 
Catholic theological circles.  Tracey Rowland objects to the use of  secular language to set out Catholic claims, 
because it misleadingly suggests that there is substantial agreement where in fact none exists (Rowland 2003; see 
also 2005).  It makes it easier for Catholics to accept secular understanding of  concepts such as autonomy and 
freedom, and by extension therefore, dignity.  The question of  exclusivity in this case falls within a general 
criticism of  Catholic use of  what MacIntyre calls the ‘idiom and rhetoric of  rights’ which he argues, ‘cannot 
serve genuinely rationale purposes.’ (MacIntyre 1991, p.110)  George Cardinal Pell prefers ‘a greater use of  
Godly language’ (Pell 2003, p.1) when conversing with secularists or advancing the Catholic understanding of  
justice, morality and the common good.  MacIntyre, Rowland and Pell all argue that a genuinely Catholic account 
cannot use the liberal language of  rights as this is a distortion.  !
The liberal language of  human rights starts with an orientation for what is owed to human beings, rather than 
the duty human beings have. Human beings are indebted to God and have a duty to fulfil their side of  the 
covenant, to obey his commands, to do his will. This is the inverse of  the self  actualising message of  human 
rights which is about freedom, protection from overlords, and entitlement. It is a different starting point from 
human beings deserve respect.  The meta narrative of  human rights, the overarching presumption and place 
about humanity in the universe is, therefore flawed from this theological perspective. Christian ethics should 
surely be theocentric, rather than anthropocentric.  !
Protestant theologies for human rights and dignity !
However, there are alternative theological responses to human rights in both Protestant and Catholic thought. 
George Newlands offers a different Protestant response. He takes a Christological perspective on human rights 
and human dignity (Newlands 2006), which he restated and developed with Richard Amesbury in their 2008 
collaborative work, Faith and Human Rights: Christianity and the Global Struggle for Human Dignity 
(Amesbury & Newlands 2008).  They explore how Christologies contribute to the struggle for dignity, arguing 
that they should, ‘encapsulate the nature of  the Christian understanding of  the love of  God, illuminating the self  
giving, self-dispossessing nature of  divine reality as a pattern of  human relationships.’ (Ibid. p.123)  Common to 
these offerings is the interest in grounding conception of  human dignity in the Christian narrative, as opposed to 
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secular philosophical traditions of  dignity. Newlands conceives such integration through a Christological 
conceptualisation of  human rights and the dignity of  the human person, drawing on Schleiermacher’s person 
based theology.  In this theology, the person is the person of  God in Jesus Christ, a Christian construal of  
human love, and a Christomorphic shape in history (a history shaped by Christ) that transcends the social, 
political and personal and expresses God from within human suffering (Newlands 2006, pp.143-73).  Newlands 
articulates Christology for human rights, rather than a Christology of  human rights.  Such a Christology gives 
attention to the reconciling power in Christ and the instatiation of  the person of  God in a specific human being 
(the concretisation in the temporal and physical of  the abstract and universal).  This figure is then identified with 
the loss of  all human rights through the crucifixion.  Incarnation presents a reality of  the involvement of  God 
with human bodies and His concern about what happens to them.  Jesus Christ can be imagined as God’s 
incarnation of  human rights, as subject and object of  human rights concern.  Through this human beings are 
recognized as God’s own, with their worth reaffirmed and a destiny to be fulfilled through His unconditional 
love.  Newlands’ Christology is not just a Christology for human rights but a Christology for the dignity of  the 
human person.  It is not just human rights that are Christologically understood, but the inherent worth and 
nature of  the person that are seen in these terms. !
The claim for the worth of  a person is made meaningful through a Christological person based narrative.  These 
may not be the only beliefs that could possibly give meaning to the worth claim of  a person.  The distinctiveness 
of  Christian theology for establishing dignity is that in Christology, a theology of  human rights is person-
centred, and therefore particularly well suited for an educational project that is defined by a moral purpose of  
learning for and in the human person.  This moral purpose is expressed through the phrase for the dignity of  the 
human person.  It seeks to inculcate values, influence moral decision-making and human behaviour.  These 
moral features are contextualised by the intrinsic worth of  the person, a being beloved of  God, and the necessity 
to respond to that worth so that the person may flourish. !
Soulen and Woodhead place human rights on a divine foundation, rejecting the basis suggested in Kantian 
thinking.  Those scholars view the relationship between religion and human rights as one in which rights are 
derived from divine commands or a universal moral law.  They locate the source of  human rights in something 
other than the inherent worth, the sacredness of  individual human beings themselves.  Amesbury and Newlands 
suggest that this is inadequate, ‘[I]nsofar as they place the object of  moral respect somewhere outside human 
beings themselves, these accounts are better suited to talk of  duties than to talk of  inherent rights.  Respect for 
human beings is rendered a by-product of  respect for something “higher”.’ (2008, p.56) This is precisely what 
Soulen and Woodhead and others do. !!
Catholic theologies for human rights and dignity !
Contemporary Catholic theology, as articulated in the Vatican II teachings, and the writings of  Pope John Paul II 
provide sources of  Christian support for human rights and dignity.  In Dignitatis humanae, the Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, the Roman Catholic Church declares: !
A sense of  the dignity of  the human person has been impressing itself  more and more deeply on the 
consciousness of  contemporary man and this has inspired a search into the sacred tradition and doctrine of  the 
Church, the treasury out of  which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the 
things that are old. (Paul VI 1965, p.1) !!
Much of  this draws from the belief  of  imago dei in early Christian writers.  St Ireneaus (2nd century – 202 CE) 
writes ‘For the glory of  God is a living man’ (Against Heresies Book 4, Chapter 20,7, in Robert & Donaldson 
1971).  Later, Lactantius (240-320 CE), the Christian apologist, spoke of  the dignity that humans have as part of  
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God’s creation when he states that God has made humankind as a sacred animal, (Divine Institutes 6.20, in 
Robert & Donaldson 1971, p.187). This status conferred duties and responsibilities on others.  He places 
restrictions on the killing of  humans including murder, war or infant exposure. Human dignity is equated with 
sanctity; a special, holy thing that must be protected, irrespective of  the person’s action, behaviour or social 
standing.  Respecting others is not purely a matter of  obedience to God’s law, but a response to the worth of  the 
person. Clement of  Alexander (160-215 CE), Gregory the Wonderworker (213-270 CE) and John Chrysostom 
(347-407 CE) believed human beings are reborn in the image of  Christ, through God’s redemptive power and 
through life in the Spirit via the practice of  Christian virtue (Soulen & Woodhead 2006, p.5).  The Church fathers  
(for example, Origen (185-254 CE), St. Irenaeus (2nd century – 202 CE), St. John Chrysostom (347-407 CE) and 
St. Basil of  Caesaria Cappadocia (329-379 CE) maintain a universalistic perspective and they argue that all human 
beings possess reason, freedom and immortality (Erhueh 1987).  Human beings are rational animals and 
immortal by virtue of  being sons of  god (Ibid. p.36).  Miguel writes, ‘Saint Leo the Great classes dignity as an 
ontological category, without moral content.  This allows him to sustain that the Man “is born” worthy (würdig, 
dignus) and all the human beings from that perspective share the “same” or “equal” dignity.’  (Miguel 2002, p.4). 
This early Church thought provides a backdrop for contemporary Catholic orientation towards dignity and 
rights. !
David Hollenbach’s book on human rights in the Catholic tradition, Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing 
the Catholic Human Rights Tradition (1979) traces the beginnings of  the emphasis on dignity and rights in Leo 
XIII’s encyclicals through John XXIII’s writing at the time of  Vatican II.  The language of  the dignity of  the 
person and rights is central in Catholic thinking (Ibid.; Ruston 2004) and is not an abstract or ethereal reality but 
is realized in concrete conditions of  personal, social, economic, and political life.’ (Hollenbach 1979, p.68). It is 
closely aligned to the notion of  dignity in the UDHR.  Murray noted that the Vatican council statements, ‘are 
programmatic for the future.  From now on, the Church defines her mission in the temporal order in terms of  
the realization of  human dignity, the promotion of  the rights of  man, the growth of  the human family towards 
unity, and the sanctification of  the secular activities of  this world.’ (1966, p.601) The Second Vatican Council’s 
work on religious freedom was founded on dignity.  Murray writes, ‘the Council declares that the right “has its 
foundation in the very dignity of  the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed word of  God 
and by reason itself. The right is therefore inalienable”.’ (1967, p.5)  Freedom and dignity, key elements of  
Kantian philosophical thinking, are here expressed in distinctive but compatible terms, as part of  the wider 
recognition of  the importance of  these ideas in understanding human rights. !
John Paul II, like Soulen and Woodhead, rejects Nietzsche’s attack on rationality and morality.  In Fides et Ratio 
he says the rejection of  objective truth is an attack on the grounding of  human dignity (John Paul II 1998, p.
90.iii), whereby issues of  justice and human rights become matters of  social convention rather than necessary 
extensions in the realization of  human dignity.  The absolutisation of  freedom thus fosters an individualistic 
ethos wherein each individual possesses ‘his or her own truth’ (John Paul II 1993, pp.35 & 41).  Once freedom 
has been uprooted from all objectivity, it alone becomes the source of  values (John Paul II 1993, paras 32, 48, 84 
& 106) granting people the right to determine what is good and evil (John Paul II 1993, paras 35 & 51) and 
undermining any basis for personal rights commonly held by all. !
However the criticism is that dignity is becoming attributive, not that it is derivative of  an external foundation.  
In Veritatis Splendor (John Paul II 1993) he describes this as freedom exalted to the point of  idolatry (para. 32 & 
para. 48) gaining ‘a primacy over truth’, so that truth itself  comes to be a creation of  freedom.  This endangers 
dignity and the inherent value that it has.  In Pope John Paul II’s reflection on the parable of  the Prodigal Son 
(Lk 15:14-32) in his 1980 letter on God’s mercy, Dives in Misericordia he refers to the tragedy of  lost dignity by 
the son who wastes his inheritance and finds himself  in circumstances below that of  his Father’s servants.  Here 
moral dignity is a function of  man’s faithfulness to God.  However the man continues to be his Father’s son, as 
Williams suggests, ‘That is while moral dignity was truly lost through sin, there is another more rudimentary, 
ontological dignity that remains.’ (Williams 2005, p.157)  Elsewhere John Paul II describes this as personal 
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dignity, ‘Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself  pledges to guarantee this.’ (1995a, p.9)  
On October 5, 1995, he addressed the United Nations General Assembly, repeating a message he gave the UN 
on October 2, 1979.  He said that the quest for freedom ‘has its basis in those universal rights which human 
beings enjoy by the very fact of  their humanity.’  (1995b) From this survey, Williams, like Ruston and 
Hollenbach, comes to a different view from that of  MacIntyre, Rowland and Pell on the use of  liberal language 
about rights and dignity, and John Paul II when he was Karol Wojtyla wrote in Love and Responsibility of  a 
notion of  dignity that is inherent and not derivative (Wojtyla 1982, p.27) in Kantian language quoting his maxim 
‘act always in such a way that the other person is the end and not merely the instrument of  your action’ (Ibid. p.
28) He indicates that the principle is the foundation for human rights and freedoms, ‘This principle, thus 
formulated lies at the basis of  all the human freedoms, properly understood, and especially the freedom of  
conscience.’ (Ibid.) !
This theological development presents an understanding of  dignity that is both contextualized within a Christian 
tradition, while at the same time is foundational in a manner that aligns itself  closely to the conceptualisation in 
the UDHR.  It presents an example of  how resources have been identified within a religious tradition that can 
support the moral force of  the foundational nature of  dignity. For some it is a step too far.  Ernest L. Fortin is 
concerned with what he calls, ‘John Paul II’s unprecedented insistence on the more or less Kantian notion of  the 
dignity that is said to accrue to the human being, not because of  any actual conformity with the moral law, but 
for no other reason than that he is an ‘autonomous subject of  moral decision’ (Fortin 1991, p.229).  Fortin sees 
dignity as contingent on the fulfillment of  prior duties, a dignity that is to be achieved and which could be lost.  
Fundamentally Fortin believes that contemporary Catholic teaching is discontinuous with pre-modern teaching.  
Pre-modern Christian ethics were ethics of  duty, not an ethic of  rights.  !
Against Fortin, Williams has argued that the human rights tradition and conception of  dignity expressed in 
recent Church teachings and the work of  John Paul II can be based in the Catholic Church’s pre-modern 
tradition.  Fortin is drawing on one of  the traditions of  dignity found in the early Christian sources, but he seems 
to not recognize that there are other traditions of  dignity, such as ontological or inherent dignity that is 
associated with the Imago Dei doctrine.  Williams also notes that Fortin fails to observe John Paul II’s criticisms 
of  theories of  moral autonomy in Veritatis Splendor, 35-41 (Williams 2005, p.154 note 19 and p.155) and also 
Aquinas’ and Bonaventure’s understanding that dignity is a mark of  personhood, ‘not an addendum pasted onto 
personhood – it is essential to the very concept of  personhood.’ (Ibid. p.155)  Pope John XXIII expresses this 
when he writes, ‘A man who has fallen into error does not cease to be a man.  He never forfeits his personal 
dignity; and that is something that must always be taken into account.’ (John XXIII 1963, p.158) !!
Concluding Remarks !
Maritain, contributing as a member of  the group gathered by UNESCO to consider the questions of  dignity at 
the time of  the drafting of  the UDHR, expressed before either took place in 1944, ‘The dignity of  the human 
person?  The expression means nothing if  it does not satisfy that … the human person has the right to be 
respected, is the subject of  rights, possesses rights.  These are the things that are owed to man because of  the 
very fact that he is a man.’ (Maritain 1943, p.37)  It is on dignity that Maritain thinks a multiple justification 
approach to human rights can be sustained: !
I am quite certain that my way of  justifying belief  in the rights of  man and the ideal of  liberty, equality, fraternity 
is the only way with a firm foundation in truth.  This does not prevent me from being in agreement on these 
practical convictions with people who are certain that their way of  justifying them, entirely different from mine 
or opposed to mine ... is equally the only way founded upon truth. (UNESCO 1948, pp.10-11) !!
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At the heart of  these theological perspectives on human rights is the extent to which Christian thought should 
be framed mainly by the account of  the fall, human sin and redemption, and whether there is an inherent 
goodness that justifies human rights or an attribute goodness, that comes from God.  Christian thought could be 
framed by the goodness of  Divinely created thing of  worth, made in the image and likeness of  God, the 
importance of  God becoming human so that humanity could become divine, and the centrality of  a 
Christological or pneumatological understanding that sees the divine in the human person, what so ever you do 
to the least of  my brothers and sisters you do to me. Christology presents the possibility of  a Christ centred 
human rights, an orientation for the other, grounded in a belief  that it is out treatment of  the other that is our 
treatment of  Christ. Incarnation and divination or theosis. To be Christian is to be Christ like, to seek to be self  
sacrificing for the other.   !
The second deciding feature of  this theological debate relates to the extent to which the recontextualisation of  
discourse around dignity and human rights is theologically justified (as in the theologies of  interruption) or 
theologically dubious (as in the claims that theology has been corrupted by liberalism). !
The existence of  these distinct theological threads explain how Church schools that are human rights respecting 
can both be considered to be authentically Christian and alarmingly secular, depending on the theological 
framework adopted.   !!!!
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